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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Joseph Bankman and Ronald Gilson published Why Start-ups?
in the Stanford Law Review.1 In that essay, Bankman and Gilson argued that,
in theory at least, startups should not exist. No innovative employee should
leave her corporate employer to form a startup; instead, the corporation
should win the “auction” to keep all promising entrepreneurs and ideas in
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1. Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289 (1999).
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house due to the corporation’s tax, information, and scope advantages.2
Theory is one thing, the real world is another. Engineers do leave large
corporations to form startups, and startups have flourished into technological
giants. The NASDAQ, comprised of these former startups, is at an all-time
high.3 Bankman and Gilson attribute this theoretical/real-world divergence
to both complications with developing innovative ideas inside large
corporations4 and to the psychic rewards employee get from leaving to
become their own bosses.5 In the Innovator’s Dilemma, former Harvard
Business School Professor Clayton Christensen also identified asymmetries
within large corporations as an obstacle to “intrapreneurship,” or innovating
in-house.6 Coupled with traditional concerns about the nimbleness and
adaptability of a large organization by its very nature, large corporations are
thought to be incompatible with groundbreaking innovation. Hence, we have
startups.
Startups are here to stay, and Bankman and Gilson’s question has a
satisfactory answer. But startups only flourish if they receive funding. An
innovative idea, no matter how promising, needs capital to be developed, and
entrepreneurs need help navigating the transition from startup to large
company. Who funds startups? Can the corporation play a role here?
The answer to “who funds startups?,” at least to this point, is clear to
almost everyone with a rudimentary understanding of this area: venture
capitalists.7 Leading Silicon Valley venture capital firms include Kleiner
Perkins, Sequoia Capital, Benchmark Partners, and Andreessen Horowitz,
2. Id. at 293 (“When all else is equal, the employer has advantages – tax, information,
and scope – that should result in it consistently winning the auction” to keep employees and
their ideas in-house.).
3. Karen Langley, Nasdaq Composite Touches 10000 as Post-Virus Rally Marches On,
WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2020 5:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nasdaq-composite-erasescoronavirus-losses-to-seize-new-record-11591695001 [https://perma.cc/4UMR-KTXW].
4. See Bankman & Gilson, supra note 1, at 290–92 (stating that problems with
developing ideas in-house include property rights disputes over the innovation and corporate
compensation structures).
5. Id. at 306.
6. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY
BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS 33–68, 89–110 (2005) [hereinafter
THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA]; see also Darian M. Ibrahim, Intrapreneurship, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1741, 1747 (2016) (favorably discussing Christensen’s theories and layering on
a corporate law solution to reducing the asymmetries he identifies as barriers to in-house
innovation).
7. See Will Drover, et. al., A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity
Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment,
Crowdfunding, and Accelerators, 43 J. MGMT. 1820, 1827 (2017) (“Venture capitalists—
professional investors funding portfolios of potentially high-growth ventures—have had a
transformative impact on the modern entrepreneurial landscape.”).
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and they have funded the likes of Google, Facebook, Uber, Airbnb, Coinbase
and virtually every other startup success story.8 Venture capitalists are the
go-to financiers for startups due to their dedicated funds for startup
investment – an extremely risky endeavor – along with their decades-long
experience in this area and connections with executives, attorneys,
investment banks, and virtually every other relevant player necessary to
grow and develop rapid-growth startups to a successful exit.9
Why are venture capitalists the winners in the startup funding game?
First, they have dedicated themselves to this space. They are not alone, as
angel investors, venture lenders, and now crowdfunding investors also invest
in early-stage startups. Yet these ancillary players in entrepreneurial finance
all depend on VCs to fund and advise startups as they grow and either exit
via IPO or sale to a larger company. Angel investors fund startups with their
own limited cash in their earlier stages;10 crowdfunders come in even earlier
to replace friends and family investment at the very early stages of a startup’s
life cycle,11 and venture lenders provide short-term loans for startups until
their next venture capital investment.12
None of these financiers,
independently or together, challenge venture capitalists as the dominant
technology financiers.13
But there is one player whose entry into this space can significantly alter
that dynamic: the large corporation. Unlike the ancillary players who depend
on venture capital, large corporations have sufficient capital to fund startups
8. From Alibaba to Zynga: 45 of the Best VC Bets of All Time and What We Can Learn
from Them, CBINSIGHTS (June 9, 2021), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/best-venturecapital-investments/ [https://perma.cc/Y8PD-NRCJ].
9. Successful exits are either initial public offerings (IPOs) or acquisition by a larger
company. Mark A. Lemley & Andrew McCreary, Exit Strategy, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2020)
(discussing the paucity of the “two only successful exit options” for VC-backed startups).
10. See infra Part II.
A. Angel Investment
11. See infra Part II.
B. Crowdfunding
12. See infra Part II.
C. Venture Debt
13. Another recent trend is mutual funds investing in startups. However, mutual funds
tend to invest in unicorns. See Jeff Schwartz, Should Mutual Funds Invest in Startups? A
Case Study of Fidelity Magellan Fund’s Investments in Unicorns (and other Startups) and the
Regulatory Implications, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2017) (highlighting that mutual funds are
investing in famous unicorns). Sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds sometimes invest in
later-stage startups with higher valuations as well. See Elizabeth Pollman, Private Company
Lies, 109 GEO. L.J. 353, 373 (2020) (“Whereas in the past, startups were typically funded by
family and friends, angel investors, and venture capitalists, in recent years these investors
have been joined by family offices, hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds, and sovereign
wealth funds.”); id. (“[T]he greater diversity of investors in late-stage rounds of financing has
expanded the universe from the Silicon Valley community of VCs that are repeat players in a
reputational market to a global mix of institutional investors that resembles public markets in
some respects.”).
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to a successful exit without help. They may also be able to offer superior
value-added services to startups over venture capitalists. For example, if the
startup’s technology aligns with the parent company’s, as “strategic”
corporate venture capital investments do,14 that is a big plus to the
entrepreneur. Corporations may also get a “first look” at the most promising
startups, if the would-be entrepreneurs are currently corporate employees.
For reasons explored in the Article, leading technology corporations can
leverage their corporate clout to become significant players in Silicon
Valley going forward. If not as innovators – or innovators alone – then in
funding others’ innovation.
Until now, large corporations were not a serious challenge to venture
capitalists dominance in the startup-financing game for several reasons. One
challenge is how to fund dynamic, fast-moving innovations when
corporations by definition become more bureaucratic and slow as they age
and scale to large public companies. The solution: establish corporate
venture capital units that operate independently from their parent
corporation, and more like a venture capitalist, with only financial support
from the parent.15
A second challenge is, even if large corporations can fund startups, 16
why would they? Established corporations display a rational preference for
incremental improvements on existing products.17 Making the next iPhone,
with an established user base and brand loyalty, is easier than obtaining buyin on a brand new product. And if a challenger to the iPhone or related
product emerges, Apple can try to buy them. However, from a financial
perspective, a corporation who acts as venture capitalist can capture
tremendous financial upside for their parent corporation if it funds the next
technology stalwart. It is a cheaper (due to the early stage investments) and
more diversified (given a broad range of these investments) than buying one
competitor when it is a serious challenge. Also, from an informational
perspective, a corporate venture capitalist can gain advantages for its parent

14. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
15. See Drover, supra note 7 at 1833 (“The impact of CVC investing—where existing
corporations seek minority equity stakes in young ventures—has triggered a growing body of
research.”).
16. Balance sheets of leading technology corporations reveals boodles of free cash. Tesla
just invested $1.5 billion in bitcoin, and that was only 7.5% of its free cash on hand. Tesla,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 31, 33 (Dec. 31, 2020).
17. Christensen called these “sustaining innovations.” CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6, at
xxii, xxvi.
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corporation by surveying the landscape of what startups are doing.18 And
finally, as Christensen explores, a large corporation that has no ownership in
disruptive technologies is likely to someday fall the victim to one. 19 Thus,
corporations have increasing incentives to act as venture capitalists on the
side.
The remainder of this Article makes the case for corporate venture
capital as a potentially game-changing entrant into entrepreneurial finance.
Part II begins by retracing the ancillary players in entrepreneurial finance
and their roles in the startup ecosystem. After finding each of them incapable
of denting the venture capitalist’s current dominance, Part III introduces the
large corporation as venture capitalist. Part III discusses the growing scale
of corporate venture capital and why it may be desirable for startups,
innovation, and society as a whole. Part IV looks at legal differences that
may become important for corporate venture capitalists to consider,
including securities, antitrust, and corporate law concerns.
Importantly, the Article concludes not by per se endorsing corporate
venture capital over venture capital, but recognizing that corporate venture
capital has a greater role to play in entrepreneurial finance going forward. It
is likely that corporate venture capital and traditional venture capital work
side-by-side.20 This new state of the world with corporate venture capitalist
has important implications for future law-and-entrepreneurship and law-and18. This is unlike venture capital firms. See Jennifer S. Fan, Catching Disruption:
Regulating Corporate Venture Capital, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 341, 343 (2018) (“[Venture
capital firms] purely focus on financial returns, most corporations seek strategic benefits from
their venture investments, in addition to financial returns.”); see also Gary Dushnitsky &
Dovev Lavie, How Alliance Formation Shapes Corporate Venture Capital Investment in the
Software Industry: A Resource-Based Perspective, 4 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 22,
38–40 (2010) (study finding that strategic alliances and corporate venture capital may
complement each other).
19. Examples abound: Blockbuster to Netflix, taxis to Uber, hotels to Airbnb, travel
agencies to Expedia, and brick-and-mortar retail businesses to Amazon. As Michael Blanding
points out, the “second wave of Internet disruption” is now focused on “decoupling” activities
that consumers value from the ones they do not. See Michael Blanding, Disruptors Sell What
Customers Want and Let Competitors Sell What They Don’t, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 2, 2015), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/disruptors-sell-what-customerswant-and-let-competitors-sell-what-they-dont [https://perma.cc/X86H-RUN2]. Blanding
provides an example of decoupling: “Watching TV and watching commercials, for example,
have traditionally gone together—the former creating value for the consumer, the latter
capturing it for the company. When TiVo came along, it allowed viewers to record the shows
they wanted without all of those annoying ads.” Id. Innovators seek to deliver what consumers
find most valuable, while leaving what is not to the established players. Id.
20. Indeed, this is already the case thus far. See infra note 68 and accompanying text
(discussing how corporate venture capitalists invest in start-ups alongside traditional venture
capitalists).
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economics scholarship.21 As a descriptive piece of scholarship, this paper
answers some questions but leaves others that need empirical investigation
dangling.22 Normatively, it makes the cautious case for corporate venture
capital, finding strong tailwinds and few legal concerns.
II. THE FRINGE PLAYERS: ANGELS, CROWDFUNDERS, AND VENTURE
LENDERS
Before reaching the emerging heavyweight bout—venture capitalists
versus corporate venture capitalists—it is necessary to explore why venture
capitalists have dominated the startup investing space to date. There are
other dedicated startup financiers and financing methods, yet all depend
on—and none can challenge—the venture capitalist’s dominance. The main
ones that will be discussed are angel investors, crowdfunders, and venture
lenders. Other less prevalent alternatives, such as state-sponsored venture
capital funds, likewise have deficiencies that make them a less attractive
option for entrepreneurs than venture capital.23
To understand why venture capitalists dominate in this space, it is
necessary to understand what startups are looking for in a financier. There
are many intangibles: a good working relationship, non-oppressive
investment terms,24 the best valuation, and so forth. But as a general matter,
21. This Article is certainly not the first examination of corporate venture capitalist, even
by me. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 18 (discussing the rise of corporate venture capital); Ibrahim,
supra note 6 (exploring the idea of a large corporation’s venture arm investing in start-ups).
But as Fan correctly points out, for the most part, “legal scholars have overlooked CVCs.”
See Fan, supra note 18, at 344.
22. These questions include whether corporate venture capitalists use non-compete
agreements whereby the startup agrees not to sell itself later to a rival of the corporate venture
capitalist, or a right of first refusal that grants the corporate venture capitalist the right to
match the price that any other firm might offer to purchase the startup in the future. Also, an
empirical comparison of corporate venture capitalist investment contracts versus venture
capitalist investment contracts (examining corporate venture capital’s use staged financing
and the like) would be a fruitful study.
23. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717,
736–38 (2010) (discussing state-led efforts to fund local entrepreneurs and the typical
problems encountered). Accelerators are another growing option, with Y Combinator
becoming an important feeder of startups to leading venture capitalists. See Mirit Eyal-Cohen,
Innovation Agents, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 176 (2019) (discussing Y Combinator);
RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH PAD 4 (2012) (discussing the role of Y Combinator in startup investing); see also supra note 13 (noting that some mutual funds are now investing in
startups).
24. For a discussion of the preferred stock venture capitalists often receive, as opposed
to the entrepreneur’s common stock, compare William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A
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startup financiers provide two main things: money and value-added services.
Startups need cash to grow, develop, and hire. Most venture capitalists fund
start-ups that have survived their earliest stages and are either expanding,
planning an IPO, or preparing for a private sale.25 A typical venture capital
round averages over $10 million.26 Investing in startups is exceedingly risky,
however, with most startups failing.27 Venture capitalists have figured out
how to navigate this space and the uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs that accompany these investments.28
The second venture capitalist contribution to a startup’s growth is
equally or more important.29 These are the “value-added services” such as
advice, mentoring, and connections that help entrepreneurs scale their

Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1815, 1874–1900 (2013) (discussing preferred
stock), with Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor Pitiful or Potentially Powerful Preferred?, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 2025, 2025–38 (2013) (discussing common stock).
25. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 1405, 1416 (2008) (citation omitted) (discussing how venture capital is not instantly
available to some start-ups).
26. In the first half of 2021, the median Series A round raised $10 million, and the median
Series B round raised $30 million. See Gené Teare, Bigger Checks, Days To Close: How
2021’s Red-Hot Venture Funding Landscape Is Shaking Up Early-Stage Investing,
CRUNCHBASE NEWS (July 26, 2021), https://news.crunchbase.com/news/bigger-checks-daysto-close-how-2021s-red-hot-venture-funding-landscape-is-shaking-up-early-stage-investing/
[https://perma.cc/24LW-WH8Q] (illustrating venture capital fundraising statistics).
27. One analysis of government statistics concluded that twenty percent of firms fail
within the first year and that sixty percent of firms close within six years of their founding.
See Robert Paul Singh, Overconfidence: A Common Psychological Attribute of Entrepreneurs
Which Leads to Firm Failure, 23 NEW ENG. J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP. 25, 26 (2020) (highlighting
the risky nature of start-up investing).
28. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003) (listing uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs as potential problems with venture capital contracting).
29. eBay, for instance, was a profitable start-up that did not require outside funding. Yet
it sought venture capital, which was provided by Benchmark Partners, in recognition that a
venture capitalist’s connections and expertise would be essential in securing a seasoned CEO
and other executives. See Ibrahim, supra note 25, at 1411 n. 13 (citing RANDALL E. STROSS,
EBOYS: THE TRUE S TORY OF THE SIX TALL MEN WHO BACKED EBAY AND OTHER BILLIONDOLLAR START-UPS 22 (2000) (discussing how eBay founders sought mentoring and advice,
not money, from venture capitalists)). Andreessen Horowitz took value-added services from
VCs to another level by having in-house recruiters and back-office functions for their portfolio
companies to share. See Louis Coppey, From Value-Added VCs to Equity Crowdfunding
Syndicates: The New Platforms of the Venture Capital Industry 10–13 (June 8, 2016) (Master
Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721
.1/104539/958429584-MIT.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/GLZ2-85QZ] (noting that
Andreessen Horowitz sought to provide their portfolio companies with in-house services).
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businesses and achieve successful exits.30 Venture capitalists play the roles
of mentors, advisors, matchmakers, parents, and friends for their portfolio
company entrepreneurs.31 Venture capitalists “mentor and monitor the
companies in which they invest. They offer assistance and support in
developing the business of their portfolio companies.” 32 They help
companies with operational guidance and connecting with potential
customers and other investors.33 They also “help almost half of their
companies to reduce their burn rate.”34 They “use their networking skills to
recruit professional managerial talent,”35 and they “can provide seasoned
expertise for decision-making, such as determining the most profitable exit
strategy.”36

30. A recent New Yorker article argues conversely that “Startups increasingly want
investors who won’t interfere or ask questions.” Charles Duhigg, How Venture Capitalists
Are Deforming Capitalism, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.newyorker.c
om/magazine/2020/11/30/how-venture-capitalists-are-deforming-capitalism [https://perma.c
c/CVG5-ACSH] (observing that, on the other hand, some start-ups do not want investors
interfering with their business)
31. See Natee Amornsiripanitch, Paul A. Gompers, & Yuhai Xuan, More Than Money:
Venture Capitalists on Boards, 35 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 513, 538–40 (2019) (describing how
venture capitalists can serve as strategic advisors); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The
Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon
Valley, 21 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 698 (1996) (venture capitalists also introduce startups to
lawyers, who “[a]s a result of their status as repeat players and reputational brokers in the
venture capital financing process . . . play a substantial role in determining which clients gain
access to which investors, and vice versa.”).
32. Mira Ganor, Improving the Legal Environment for Start-up Financing by
Rationalizing Rule 144, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2007); see Elizabeth Pollman,
Team Production Theory and Private Company Boards, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 619, 628
(2015) (“VC investors have strong motivation to monitor their investments and help them
grow.”); see also Amornsiripanitch, supra note 31, at 539
Venture capitalists are actively engaged in the companies in which they invest
and much of this activity is mediated when they join the portfolio company’s
board of directors. These activities appear to be appreciated by entrepreneurs,
who are more likely to give board seats to successful and well-connected venture
capitalists..
33. Ganor, supra note 32, at 1456.
34. Paul Gompers et al., Venture Capitalists and COVID-19 16 (Nat’l Bureau Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 27824, 2020), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w27824
[https://perma.cc/4E85-WZKU].
35. Ibrahim, (Not So) Puzzling, supra note 25, at 1411 (citing Michael Klausner & Kate
Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in Bridging
the Entrepreneurial Financing Gap 54, 58–59 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001)).
36. Id. (referencing Joshua Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Decision to Go Public,
35 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 314 (1994) (observing that experienced venture capitalists appear better
able to time IPOs than their less experienced counterparts)).
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While the entrepreneurial finance space is symbiotic and collaborative,
the top venture capitalists make a lot of money. Their dominant space in the
ecosystem is certainly envious. The remainder of this Part examines angel
investors, crowdfunders, and venture lenders and shows why all three fail as
plausible alternatives to venture capitalists as dominant startup financiers.
A. Angel Investment
Angel investors are wealthy individuals, usually ex-entrepreneurs, who
invest their personal funds in startups. 37 Angels run the gambit from the
entrepreneur’s rich uncle to professional groups such as Silicon Valley’s
Band of Angels.38 Like venture capitalists, angels provide important valueadded services. Angels are often the first outside advisors for entrepreneurs.
Therefore, angels do a considerable amount of mentoring. Angels connect
the entrepreneur to venture capitalists, as the venture capitalist follow-on
investment is necessary to both angels and entrepreneurs obtaining liquidity
from a successful exit later.39 However, angels do not provide all the valueadds that venture capitalists do. They do not have the same connections to
executives for a scaling startup or to investment banks who can take the
startup public.40
The more problematic issue for angels is that they are investing personal
funds. Even in larger angel investments, the amounts involved cannot rival
the venture capitalists hundreds of millions of investor dollars in limited
37. See Drover, supra note 7, at 1837 (defining angel investors as “individuals investing
their own capital independently or through angel groups” in “young, high-growth-potential
ventures”); Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, supra note 23, at 739 (defining angel
investors).
38. See Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, supra note 23, at 742–45 (discussing
the professionalization of angel investing through angel investment groups).
39. See Ibrahim, (Not So) Puzzling, supra note 25, at 1428–29
While the presence of angels can generally attract (or at least not inhibit) venture
capital, a venture capitalist might reject a funding proposal because of an
overreaching angel. A start-up marred by a complicated angel round is
unattractive to venture capitalists because it requires them to ‘unwind’ the nonstandard angel preferences in order to strike the venture capitalists’ standard deal.
40. See David Teten, Adham Abdelfattah, Koen Bremer, and Gyorgy Buslig, The LowerRisk Startup: How Venture Capitalists Increase the Odds of Startup Success, J. PRIV. EQUITY,
Spr. 2013, at 9 (describing the resources that venture capitalists have to increase portfolio
company value); Ibrahim, (Not So) Puzzling, supra note 25, at 1411, 1419 (2008)(observing
that venture capitalists play a more formal role than angel investors in that they have
relationships with professional managers). Angels also invest relatively small amounts in
more companies than VCs and take a less active role in them (e.g., not taking a board seat).
So, they have less incentive to provide as many value-added services as VCs do.
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partnership funds the venture capitalist has raised. This war chest disparity
is reflected in average investment size. Angel investing is early in a startup’s
life cycle, and for generally less than $1 million. 41 Not all startups need
venture capitalist-level cash, but plenty do.42
B. Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding, or raising small amounts of money over the Internet,
has been legal since 2015.43 Crowdfunding has a role to play in the startup
ecosphere, just as angel investment does. Crowdfunding, in theory, can
democratize startup investment, affording ordinary investors the opportunity
to invest in promising young companies before they go public.44 While some
entrepreneurs can turn to a rich uncle for funding, historically disadvantaged
entrepreneurs cannot.45 Crowdfunding provides these entrepreneurs with the
opportunity to attract more investors.46 And for crowdfunding investors,
41. Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389,
3397 (2013).
42. Lucas S. Osborn, Joshua M. Pearce, and Amberlee Haselhuhn, A Case for Weakening
Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2015) (“Many entrepreneurs and small
businesses have begun utilizing cloud computing as a means to reduce their start-up costs.”).
43. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, §§ 301–05, 126 Stat. 306,
315–23 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); 17 C.F.R. § 227.100 (2015). See
Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Issuers in the United States, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
155, 155 (2020) (“Startup companies can now legally sell shares of stocks, bonds, or other
securities to the broad public using equity crowdfunding . . .”).
44. Kevin G. Bender, Giving the Average Investor the Keys to the Kingdom: How the
Federal Securities Laws Facilitate Wealth Inequality, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 3 (2015) (“the
federal securities laws facilitate wealth inequality by denying average middle class investors
the ability to participate in the private placement . . . securities market”); Rodrigues, supra
note 41, at 3390–91 (“The dirty little secret of U.S. securities law is that the rich not only have
more money – they also have access to types of wealth-generating investments not available,
by law, to the average investor.”).
45. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without The Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1481,
1486 (2017) (“Scholars have long-cited a funding gap between investors and startups. . . .
Crowdfunding was also designed to democratize startup investing, so that ‘ordinary
Americans’ could have a chance to own the next Facebook or Twitter before they are public
(and commanding a much higher stock price).”) (citations omitted); Schwartz, supra note 43,
at 156 (citing one study finding that twenty-eight percent of crowdfunding issuers had a
woman on the executive team, a much higher percentage than startups funded by angels or
venture capitalists); id. at 160–61 (noting that traditional entrepreneurial finance
disadvantages women, minority, and other entrepreneurs without connections).
46. See Bender, supra note 44, at 25 (noting that before crowdfunding, middle class
investors were excluded from potentially lucrative private placement opportunities);
Schwartz, supra note 43, at 169 (“One of the primary goals of equity crowdfunding is to create
an inclusive method of raising capital where any entrepreneur can have a chance to pitch their
business idea to the crowd, regardless of their age, wealth, connections, or gender.”).
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especially non-accredited ones, this mechanism offers access to early-stage
investments that have been historically unavailable.
Crowdfunding, somewhat obviously, should not be viewed as a viable
alternative to venture capital for two main reasons. First, the cash raised
from crowdfunding investors is insufficient to carry a startup past its initial
capital needs. From 2015-2018, the median startup sought to raise around
$55,000 in a crowdfunding campaign.47 A startup was legally prohibited
from raising more than $1 million from crowdfunding in any given year –
with that number just being raised to $5 million. 48 Compared to the venture
capitalist’s initial round average of over what crowdfunding allows and
significantly over what it actually commands,49 it is clear that the most
promising startups on a path to a successful exit will have to seek cash
beyond the crowd.50
Second, crowdfunding campaigns supply startups with only cash, not
value-added services. The crowd, by definition, is comprised of widely
dispersed individuals who cannot offer the same value-added services as
venture capitalists. I have previously argued that savvy entrepreneurs that
do not need value-added services in the early stages of their startup’s life
should use crowdfunding because they can obtain a better valuation when
selling equity.51 In other words, the decoupling of money from value-added
services allows more efficient pricing on the cash part of the investment.
Most entrepreneurs, especially as the startup grows, will need value-added
services, however, and the geographic dispersion and relative lack of
sophistication of crowdfunding investors means entrepreneurs must look
beyond crowdfunding for these services. Crowdfunding can forge a path to
venture capital, and should only exist in conjunction with it.
C. Venture Debt
Venture lending is another source of capital for startups. The puzzle I
47. See Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without The Crowd, supra note 45, at 1506 (referencing
research that found issuers sought to raise only $55,000 per offering).
48. See Schwartz, supra note 43, at 158 (“issuers may only raise about one million dollars
a year” from crowdfunding); see also 17 CFR § 227.100(a)(1) (2021) (raising the number to
$5 million).
49. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
50. Schwartz, supra note 43, at 156 (“crowdfunding issuers are overwhelmingly earlystage companies with just a couple of employees and little to no revenue or assets”).
51. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV.
561, 590 (2015) (“In short, the inherent passivity of [crowdfunding] investors—a seeming
negative—would actually appeal to entrepreneurs who wish to unbundle the cash and valueadded service components of traditional entrepreneurial finance.”) (emphasis in original).
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posed in my article Debt as Venture Capital was as follows: why do earlystage startups with no collateral or revenue receive billions of dollars in loans
that have to be repaid?52 A traditional bank would never make these loans—
the interest rate payments could never make up for the default risks, as most
startups fail.53
The puzzle is explained by an implicit deal worked out with venture
capitalists. Venture lenders do not lend until a startup has secured an initial
round of traditional venture capital. Once that startup receives traditional
venture capital, the venture capitalist’s funds are used partially to grow the
startup, and partially to repay the venture lenders.54 Why would venture
capitalists allow their funds to be used for this purpose rather than go
exclusively towards growing the startup? It is because venture debt provides
the venture capitalist some advantages. Venture capitalists rely on venture
lenders to monitor the startup’s burn rate (since they hold the startups deposit
accounts)55 and extend the “runway” until the next round of traditional
venture capital is needed.56 This means the original venture capitalist – the
one with the implicit deal with the venture lenders – suffers less dilution
when the next round of equity is eventually sold to a new investor (as the
equity is worth more later, and less has to be sold for the same investment
amount).
The problem with venture debt as a replacement to traditional venture
capital is evident: venture debt only exists with traditional venture capital.
Venture capitalists pay off the venture debt. Therefore, venture debt will
never replace traditional venture capital, but will only co-exist with it. Just
as with angels and crowdfunders, the venture capitalist is essential to all of
them.
III. THE LARGE CORPORATION AS VENTURE CAPITALIST
This Part turns to large corporations as a potential non-fringe player in

52. Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169 (2010).
53. Id. at 1175 (noting startups “do not appear to be borrowing candidates whose high
risks are worth the limited rewards. To avoid defaults, lenders will prefer companies with
positive cash flows and tangible assets that can serve as collateral should cash flows fail.”).
54. Id. at 1185 (explaining venture lenders “loan to start-ups in exchange for VCs’
implicit guarantees of loan repayment”).
55. Id. at 1195 (noting venture lenders monitor startups “in unique ways that add value
to VCs’ own monitoring efforts,” including using debt repayment obligations as a disciplining
mechanism and tracking the startup’s bank accounts).
56. Id. at 1196 (explaining that extending the time until the next venture capitalist round
“is important because it helps the [previous venture capitalists] avoid [greater] dilution.”).
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entrepreneurial finance. Organizational bureaucratic hurdles within large
corporations have long thought to be incompatible with truly disruptive
innovation.57 Speed — being the first to market and being able to pivot
quickly when necessary — is vital to innovation. These are things venture
capitalists do well.58 Conversely, they are not attributes associated with large
corporations.59
If slogging through bureaucratic mud implies a poorly run organization,
Clayton Christensen points out that well-run organizations get disrupted by
life-changing innovations too.60 First, while entrepreneurial employees at
established corporations may want to pursue game-changing disruptive
innovations, middle managers are focused on pleasing existing high-end
customers though incremental improvements on existing products and
services.61 Coupled with these asymmetric motivations are asymmetric
information problems, meaning that entrepreneurial employees’ ideas do not
make their way up the corporate ladder to the decision-makers that could

57. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 23 at 194 (“Entrepreneurial firms and large conglomerates
have often been viewed as antipoles. While the former has been portrayed as young, creative,
and flexible firms, the latter symbolized corporations with much bureaucracy, hierarchy, and
stagnation.”) (citations omitted).
58. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing the “need for speed” in
entrepreneurship).
59. See Eyal-Cohen, supra note 23, at 207–08 (2019)
Although economies of experience generally constitute a beneficial feature of
intrapreneurship by lowering the costs of innovation research and production,
increases in age and scope may result in enlarged costs. This phenomenon is
referred to as diseconomies of experience, and it can occur for a variety of
reasons. For instance, established firms may suffer from duplication of efforts
and office politics. Firm beurocracy and lower-level organizational inertia often
directly correlates to firm size and can undermine innovativeness. Other factors
such as increased bureaucratic processes, multi-level administrative procedures,
controlling management, and adherence to traditions can also
hinder innovation in established firms.
Gary Hamel & Michele Zanini, More of Us Are Working in Big Bureaucratic Organizations than
Ever Before, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 5, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/07/more-of-us-are-working-inbig-bureaucratic-organizations-than-ever-before [https://perma.cc/7LFE-FEGV] (“[O]ur research
suggests that bureaucracy is not inevitable; it’s not the inescapable price of doing business in a
complicated world. Rather, it’s a cancer that eats away at economic productivity and
organizational resilience.”).
60. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6, at xvi-xx.
61. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6 at xxii; cf. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 23, at 199 (explaining
successful intrapreneurship depends on “the ability of middle-level managers to promote
[intrapreneurial] initiatives, and the capacity of top management to allow viable
entrepreneurial initiatives to influence the corporate strategy.”).
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greenlight them.62 Instead, they get stuck in middle management, suffering
a slow death.
A. What is Corporate Venture Capital?
Corporate venture capital sprung out of the innovator’s dilemma. If
large corporations do not participate in disruptive innovations, they will
ultimately be displaced. Corporate venture capital is a way for corporations
to get in on the action without changing the core of the parent company’s
business. A common definition of corporate venture capitalist is “the form
of a separate corporate venture entity that is exclusively funded by the
sponsoring corporation.”63 The employees of the corporate venture capitalist
arm are either long-term employees of the parent corporation or venture
capital partners hired away by the corporate venture capitalist. 64
Compensation for these corporate venture capitalist employees is a hot
issue—how does corporate venture capitalist employee compensation
resemble the lucrative carried interest of a venture capitalist employee
without producing jealousy among other employees of the parent
corporation?65 Or is it more along the scale of other salaried employees at
the parent corporation.
Despite these details to iron out, corporate venture capital is becoming
an increasingly common feature of large corporations.66 Large corporations
in the tech industry are sitting on piles of cash, and many think they need to
put it to work to continue their growth rates that Wall Street favors.67 As of
62. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 6, at 33–34, 94–97 (specifying
the organizational hurdles that get in the way of creating disruptive technologies within
a large corporation).
63. Tobias Weiblen & Henry W. Chesbrough, Engaging with Startups to Enhance
Corporate Innovation, 57 CMR BERKELEY 66, 70 (2015). This is not necessarily the case,
however. While some corporate venture capitalist units “are structurally separated from the
parent corporation” with “full investment discretion,” others “are embedded within a business
unit [of the corporation] and request approval and funding on a deal-by-deal basis.” Drover,
supra note 7, at 1834.
64. Drover, supra note 7, at 1834–35.
65. Drover, supra note 7, at 1835 (noting that while corporate venture capitalist
employees expect windfalls, “pressures to maintain pay equality across the corporation imply
that many corporate venture capitalists receive little more than straight salary.”).
66. Drover, supra note 7, at 1841 (“A notable feature of CVC—versus other players in
the market for entrepreneurial finance—is that it is part of very large (and often global)
corporations.”).
67. See, e.g., Pippa Stevens, Here are the 10 Companies with the Most Cash on Hand,
CNBC (NOV. 7, 2019) (Ranking the top 10 companies based on cash on hand), https://www.c
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2019, corporate venture capital participation in startup funding has reached
a record high.68 In 2019, corporate venture capitalists participated in twentyfive percent of all VC-backed deals, and corporate venture capitalists
invested alone (without VCs as co-investors) in ten percent of their deals.69
Large corporations such as Google (Alphabet), Salesforce, and Intel are
typically among the most active corporate venture capitalists. 70 By way of
example, Google’s corporate venture capital programs consistently rank at
the top of corporate venture capitalist activity.71 First, there is GV (formerly
Google Ventures).72 GV is a limited partnership with Google’s parent
company Alphabet as its sole limited partner.73 GV invests in life science,
healthcare, artificial intelligence, robotics, security, and transportation
startups at all stages.74 GV has three hundred active portfolio companies
with $5 billion under management. 75 Among its investments are Uber,
Nest, Stripe, Robinhood, and One Medical Group.76 Google also formed an
alternative intelligence-focused corporate venture fund, Gradient Ventures,
in 2017.77 Gradient primarily invests in early-stage rounds78 and takes a
minority stake in the startups in which they invest.79 CapitalG, Google’s
growth capital arm, is yet a third Google corporate venture capitalist
operating with Alphabet as its sole limited partner.80 This Article could go

nbc.com/2019/11/07/microsoft-apple-and-alphabet-are-sitting-on-more-than-100-billion-incash.html [https://perma.cc/TQP9-LWVG].
68. See CB INSIGHTS, The 2019 Global Corporate Venture Capital Report, (“Globally,
corporate venture capitalists participated in 3,234 deals worth $57.1 billion in 2019.”).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. GV, https://www.gv.com/?utm_source=startup_google&utm_medium=site [https://
perma.cc/Y85B-AS3P] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020.)
73. Id.
74. GV PORTFOLIO, https://www.gv.com/portfolio/ [https://perma.cc/Y7TM-AE66] (last
visited Oct. 30, 2020).
75. GV, supra note 72.
76. GV PORTFOLIO, supra note 74.
77. Anna Patterson, Introducing Gradient Ventures, ENTREPRENEURS BLOG (July 11,
2017), https://blog.google/technology/ai/introducing-gradient-ventures/ [https://perma.cc/A
X8U-24TN].
78. Dave Smith, Google Launched an In-House AI Fund to Help Startups Turn Sci-Fi
into ‘Nonfiction’, BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 2017, 4:52 PM), [https://perma.cc/N8E4-SMWY].
79. Id.
80. CAPITALG ABOUT US, https://capitalg.com/about/#our-story [https://perma.cc/HXC9
-Y7AQ] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). CapitalG invests globally in consumer and enterprise
companies that have established product market fit and are ready to scale. CapitalG has over
$3 billion under management and has invested in Airbnb, Credit Karma, and Lyft. See
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on about specific corporate venture capitalists, but the information is readily
available elsewhere.81
B. Benefits of Corporate Venture Capital
1. To Corporations
As one commentator describes it, partnerships between legacy
companies and startups are “stealing the show.”82 Corporations are
discovering benefits from smaller-scale relationships with young companies,
notably through corporate venture capital programs. Corporate venture
capital investments in startups can be more targeted, cheaper, and more
successful than acquisitions.83 Large corporations, especially large tech
corporations, engage in corporate venture capital for both financial and
strategic reasons. Financially, owning part of a startup that turns out to be
the next big thing produces huge gains for the parent company’s balance
sheet.84 Strategically, investing in startups that compliment, or perhaps even
have the potential to disrupt, the parent company’s business is a solution to
the innovator’s dilemma.85 One study observes that while “internal R&D of
large corporates typically focuses on furthering and enhancing current lines
of business . . . many large companies are engaging with startups as a form

CAPITALG FAQS, https://capitalg.com/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/8C5U-MMWK] (last visited
Oct. 30, 2020); CAPITALG OUR PORTFOLIO, https://capitalg.com/about/#our-story [https://per
ma.cc/T3DS-NS7K] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
81. See, e.g., The Most Active Corporate VC Firms Globally, CBINSIGHTS.COM (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporate-venture-capital-active-2014/ [https://p
erma.cc/5C25-RXP9]; United States Corporate VC Investors, CRUNCHBASE (last visited Sep.
13, 2021), https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/united-states-corporate-vc-investors [https://per
ma.cc/9JFD-9Q73].
82. Jim Stengel, Apple, Google and Other Titans are Snatching up Start-ups to Fuel
Innovation. The Secret Behind Their Successful Corporate Coupling, CNBC (Sept. 23, 2019,
10:00 a.m.), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/23/why-apple-google-are-snatching-up-start-up
s-to-fuel-innovation.html [https://perma.cc/CRC9-XSG8].
83. Id.
84. Yahoo’s investment in Alibaba is a good example. See Sue Decker, An Insider’s
Account of the Yahoo-Alibaba Deal, HARV. BUS. REV. DIGITAL ARTICLES (Aug. 6, 2014), at
2–8, https://hbr.org/2014/08/an-insiders-account-of-the-yahoo-alibaba-deal .
85. See Weiblen & Chesbrough, supra note 63, at 70 (“Corporate VCs not only pursue
financial performance, but should also support their corporate parent’s strategic goals (e.g.,
by backing startups making complementary products and services).”); Rita Waite, Corporate
VC vs VC: Corporate Venture Capital’s Priorities Differ from Institutional VCs, CB INSIGHTS
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/corporate-venture-capital-institutionalventure-capital/ [https://perma.cc/8U4R-3XJU].
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of external R&D that is more focused on penetrating growth markets.”86 This
is a good summation of the draws of corporate venture capital programs to
the parent corporation.87
2. To Startups
Corporate venture capitalists offer important value-added services to
startups.
Many are similar to what venture capitalists provide.
Entrepreneurs, however, may prefer corporate venture capitalists because
large corporations “have established distribution lines, strategic partners,
deep domain intelligence, not to mention an experienced sales force and a
global presence.”88 Google, for example, offers a Startup Residency
Program through its corporate venture capitalist, Gradient
Ventures.89 Program residents, which are some of Google’s best engineers,
product managers, designers, and business development partners, work
directly with the portfolio companies in a variety of forms, ranging from oneoff office hours to full time for a period up to twelve months.90
In one study, corporate venture capitalists were described as “more
active in providing [portfolio companies with] connections to customers, but
less active in connecting new hires and providing operational guidance.”91
The same study found that venture capitalists “spend more time helping their
companies and have more board seats than corporate VCs.” 92
The structure of private venture capital funds also places extreme
pressure on venture capitalists to cause startups to exit early. This is because

86. Brian Park & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Debunking Myths in Corporate Venture Capital:
What Works, What Doesn’t, and How to Make it Happen, 12 J. US-CHINA PUB. ADMIN. 764,
766 (2015).
87. Samir Kaji & Jessica Peltz-Zatulove, Inside the Minds of Corporate Venture
Capitalists, CB INSIGHTS (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.cbinsights.com/research/insidecorporate-vc-minds/ [https://perma.cc/B85P-DA6D] (finding an estimated seventy-six
percent of corporate venture capitalist investment is funded through the parent firm’s balance
sheet).
88. Id. at 766.
89. GRADIENT VENTURES, https://www.gradient.com [https://perma.cc/ZAY8-TSHY]
(last visited Oct. 30, 2020); From Google to AI Startups: Welcoming the Gradient Residents,
GRADIENT VENTURES BLOG (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.gradient.com/blog/articles/welcom
ing-the-gradient-residents/ [https://perma.cc/6B7T-QJ75].
90. See From Google to AI Startups: Welcoming the Gradient Residents, supra note 89
(explaining how the Gradient Residents program is designed to address the unique challenges
company founders face).
91. Gompers, supra note 34, at 17.
92. Gompers, supra note 34, at 17.
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venture capital funds have ten year life spans, by design.93 The venture
capitalist draws down funds from the fund’s limited partners when it finds
startups to invest in.94 The venture capitalist puts those funds to work, and
through its board seats etc., must cause its portfolio startups to exit within a
few years after investment in order to return funds to the limited partners
before the fund expires.95 If the limited partners made a profit on the last
fund, the venture capitalist can likely get them to re-up for the next fund.96
This time-pressured exit mechanism is thought to work well to discipline
venture capitalists and thus startups, but may not work for portfolio
companies who wish to stay private longer. In fact, without robust secondary
markets to allow trading in private startups stock before an IPO or trade sale,
unicorns could not come to be.97 And staying private longer is the trend.
Corporate venture capital, on the other hand, does not have the same
time pressures to satisfy its parent corporation. There is no fund with an
expiration date. Therefore, a startup might prefer corporate venture capital
because it can stay private longer, not having investors push for a quick
acquisition or premature IPO.98

93. Gilson, supra note 28 at 1074.
94. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8
(2012) (citing Gilson, supra note 28, at 1071) (finding that a typical venture capitalist puts up
only one percent of the fund’s capital).
95. See Gilson, supra note 28, at 1071 ([The venture capitalist] “will be in partial
liquidation during much of its term because realized profits from exiting an investment are
required to be distributed to the limited partners on an annual basis.”) (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 1074
“Assuming that the [general partner of a venture capitalist] has invested most of
a fund’s capital by the midpoint of the fund’s life, the [General Partner of a
venture capitalist] then must seek to raise additional capital for a new fund in
order to remain in the venture capital business.”
97. See Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, supra note 94, at 16–23.
98. See Song Ma, The Life Cycle of Corporate Venture Capital, 33 REV. FIN. STUDIES
358, 388 (2020)
“Success rates of investments do not correlate with CVC duration. . . . This
somewhat surprising finding suggests that CVCs are strategically focused, and
are willing to continue investing even when the firm may be financially
unpromising in a traditional investor’s view. This may also be consistent with
the view that CVCs are willing to patiently invest in certain companies because
they have means of absorbing strategic benefits while [venture capitalists]
cannot.”
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3. To Society
Corporate venture capital may also offer societal benefits beyond
traditional venture capital. It is well documented that venture capital
employees are overwhelmingly male and white.99 The National Venture
Capital Association-Deloitte Human Capital Survey captured critical data on
the workforce at U.S. venture capitalists in 2019. 100 Over three hundred
firms participated in the study, providing information on over 5,000
employees in the venture capital industry.101 The results show that racial and
ethnic minorities are underrepresented in the venture capitalist industry
compared to the U.S. workforce as a whole.102 Data from participating firms
show that only four percent of the overall workforce was black, and they
comprised three percent of investment positions and three percent of
investment partner positions.103 Hispanic employees accounted for seven
percent of the overall workforce, and they comprised four percent of
investment positions, but only four percent of investment partner
positions.104 While women comprised the same percentage of the venture
capitalist workforce as they did in the 2016 and 2018 surveys, forty-five
percent, they continued to have less representation in investment and
leadership positions.105
Not only is this underrepresentation of women and minorities a problem
for venture capitalists, but it also has trickle down effects to startups seeking
their investment. Research shows that uncorrected implicit biases cause
predominantly white-male venture capitalists to invest in white-male
entrepreneurs.106 In 2016, male entrepreneurs raised $58.2 billion from
99. Benjamin P. Edwards & Ann C. McGinley, Venture Bearding, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1873, 1877 (2019); Jennifer S. Fan, Innovating Inclusion: The Impact of Women on Private
Company Boards, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 346 (“[T]he[re are a] lack of women in the
rarefied world of venture capital”); Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial
Disparities in the Startup Ecosystem, 62 ST. LOUIS L.J. 419, 444 (2018) (noting that venture
capitalist is “another industry dominated by White males”) (citation omitted).
100. NVCA–Deloitte Human Capital Survey, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en
/pages/audit/articles/diversity-venture-capital-human-capital-survey.html [https://perma.cc/8
AAY-FHKC] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
101. Id.
102. Diversity & Inclusion in the VC Industry, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/con
tent/campaigns/us/audit/survey/diversity-venture-capital-human-capital-survey-dashboard.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/K45R-3A4V] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
103. NVCA-Deloitte Human Capital Survey, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. NVCA-Deloitte Human Capital Survey, supra note 100, at 5.
106. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1877; Fan, supra note 99 at 354 (“[F]ew

228

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 24:1

venture capitalists, while female entrepreneurs raised only $1.46 billion. 107
Additionally, startups founded by black females raised an average paltry sum
of $36,000.108
Morgan Stanley launched the Multicultural Innovation Lab to learn
more about the funding gap facing businesses, including startups, owned by
women and minorities.109 Their research determined that investors do not
necessarily see a problem.110 In fact, nearly eight in ten investors said that
women and minority entrepreneurs receive the right amount, or more, capital
than their business models deserve.111
One barrier to increasing diversity inside of venture capital firms is how
they recruit.112 Typically, venture capitalists have recruited from the C-suites
of large tech companies, from entrepreneurs that they have previously
worked, or from other venture capitalist firms—all candidate pools

women-led businesses receive private equity funding despite the fact that women-owned
firms have some of the most rapid rates of growth”); Pantin, supra note 99, at 442 (“Because
wealth is concentrated among primarily White individuals and funding streams to
entrepreneurs mirror where the wealth already exists, the result is White male entrepreneurs
receiving the majority of startup financing.”).
107. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1881 (citing Valentina Zarya, Venture
Capital’s Funding Gender Gap is Actually Getting Worse, FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2017)).
108. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1882 (citing Doree Shafrir, How Ingrained
is Sexism in Silicon Valley? Ask the Women Trying to Get Funding, CUT (Apr. 27, 2017));
see Pantin, supra note 99, at 428 (“Black women are the fastest growing group of female
entrepreneurs. The rates of entrepreneurship are on the rise, but entrepreneurs of color are
not having the same financial success at raising money within the entrepreneurial ecosystem
as their White cohort.”) (citations omitted).
109. The Growing Market Investors Are Missing, MORGAN STANLEY 1, 1 (2018),
https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/mcil/growing-market-investor
s-are-missing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JUF-3QWF].
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3. (“The median investment by equity investors in business opportunities is
nearly $1 million. Yet, for women and minority-owned businesses (WMBEs), median
investments are only $213,000 and $185,000, respectively.”).
112. Women are underrepresented in the VC industry; this may signal a pipeline issue.
See Siri Chilazi, Advancing Gender Equality in Venture Capital, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 1, 9
(2019), https://wappp.hks.harvard.edu/files/wappp/files/gender_and_culture_in_vc_literatur
e_review_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/KA2S-SVSS]
“There is a very strong perception that there are not enough qualified women to
fill the VC pipeline. The data, however, call this argument into question. Women
make up more than 40% of the student body at the top ten U.S. business schools,
as well as 36% of entering investment bankers and 45% of entering management
consultants. Moreover, women earn the majority of all postsecondary degrees
and are even close to parity in science and engineering degrees specifically. The
fact is that there are significantly more women with the requisite backgrounds for
venture capital than there are female VCs.”
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comprised of mostly white men.113 Recent societal movements and shifting
public opinion may be helping, however. Black professionals have reported
being inundated with inquiries from headhunters and venture capitalist talent
recruiters.114
Because women and minority entrepreneurs still have more difficulty
obtaining financing than their white male counterparts, they engage in
“venture bearding,”115 or attempting to pass as male or otherwise cover their
stigmatized identities and deflect attention from their differences with
investors.116 For example, a woman may increase her chances of accessing
social and economic resources by shifting a masculine identity into the
foreground.117 Unfortunately, venture bearding is a common strategy.118
Corporate venture capitalists may be able to rectify these biases,
however. Large corporations are more public, and thus more concerned,
with their images.119 Discriminating against women or minorities turns off

113. Theodore Schleifer, Silicon Valley Pledged to Break up the Boys’ Club of Investing
in 2018. How Did It Do?, VOX (Dec 31, 2018, 12:13 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/31
/18157815/silicon-valley-diversity-one-year-venture-capital-analysis [https://perma.cc/D2X
S-HX2X;] see Fan, supra note 99, at 351 (“In corporate America at large, only one in five Csuite executives is a woman. For women of color, that number is far lower--one in twentyfive.”) (citations omitted).
114. Nitasha Tiku, Black Tech Founders Say Venture Capital Needs to Move Past
“Diversity Theater”, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/tec
hnology/2020/06/10/racial-gap-vc-firms/ [https://perma.cc/KA6C-5ZDJ]. One black general
partner revealed that he received roughly twenty-five “hard inquiries” about roles at other
investment firms, not including the “soft inquiries” from recruiters who have just checked in.
115. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1877.99
116. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1877–79 (“As a term, venture bearding aims
to convey deflection, concealment, drag, and the projection of an idealized masculinity.”)
(citations omitted); see also KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS (2006) (discussing covering in general).
117. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1888–1900 (discussing how explicit
preferences for men to make investment decisions, explicit beliefs about male superiority,
systemic problems in workplace cultures, and implicit bias all present unique challenges for
female entrepreneurs in securing capital).
118. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1873; Ridhi Tariyal, To Succeed in Silicon
Valley, You Still Have to Act Like a Man, WASH. POST (July 24, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/24/to-succeed-in-silicon-valley-you-still-hav
e-to-act-like-a-man/ [https://perma.cc/TA9P-TJLF].
119. See Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1546
(2018) (“[C]hanges in social expectations about corporate behavior have also altered
corporate social activism. Many in society and within corporations now expect businesses
and executives, particularly those at large public companies, to engage with the critical social
issues of today.”) (citations omitted); Jennifer S. Fan, Woke Capital: The Role of
Corporations in Social Movements, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (2019)
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customers and public investors.120 Large corporations are disciplined by
public stock markets and perhaps consumer markets in a way that privatelyfunded venture capitalists are not.121 Diverse boards are becoming more
common for public corporations, and it follows that corporate venture
capitalists used to that culture will be more willing to implement gender
and/or racial diversity on startup boards they fund, too.122
Venture capitalists that fail to correct for bias in their capital allocation
processes miss profitable opportunities. Evidence now reveals that gender
diversity actually improves financial performance at venture capitalist
firms.123 Recently, a venture capitalist firm released the results from ten
years of investing data.124 It found that firms with a female founder
performed sixty-three percent better than its investments with all-male

In the not-so-recent past, corporations remained silent on social issues. Now,
silence may have negative ramifications. There is a societal expectation that
companies with more than $15 billion in annual revenue will weigh in on social
issues. A 2016 study by the Public Affairs Council reported that “more than
three-quarters of these companies said they experienced increased pressure to
weigh in on social issues.” Typically, publicly traded corporations experienced
more pressure than private companies to engage on various social issues. . . .
Employees and consumers, particularly millennials, expect and may even
demand that corporate leaders speak up.
(citations omitted).
120. See Elizabeth Hirsh & Youngjoo Cha, Employment Discrimination Lawsuits and
Corporate Stock Prices, 2 SOC. CURRENTS 40, 52 (2014) (“[P]ublicly traded firms subject to
Title VII sex, race, and national origin discrimination lawsuits suffer a loss in stock market
value immediately following the announcement of a legal settlement or verdict.”).
121. See Lin, supra note 119, at 1545–46
In past times, corporate executives feared a bad newspaper story; today, they
dread a bad viral video or negative trending hashtag that can hurt their brands or
stock prices exponentially more than a bad newspaper story. . . . The broad reach
and deep impact of social activism powered by new information technology
means that businesses are frequently engaged in social issues whether they want
to be or not.
(citations omitted).
122. Fan, supra note 99, at 350 (“A full 60% . . . of the U.S. unicorn companies have allmale boards, as compared with nearly 5% of Fortune 500 companies.”).
123. See Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1922; see also Chilazi, supra note 112,
at 2–4 (finding that gender diversity among investors boosts financial performance for VC
firms, gender-diverse portfolio companies appear to be better investments, lack of gender
diversity is associated with decreased financial performance in VC, and gender inequality hits
the bottom line directly).
124. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1904 (citing First Round: 10 Year Project,
FIRST ROUND, http://10years.firstround.com [https://perma.cc/54TH-Z72L]).
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founding teams.125 Researchers also found that VC firms that increased their
female partner hires by ten percent, observed a 1.5% spike in overall fund
returns each year, and had 9.7% more profitable exits.126
C. Drawbacks of Corporate Venture Capital
Despite the benefits corporate venture capital can offer corporations
(and their investors), startups, and society as a whole, corporate venture
capital is not without its drawbacks. Well-known venture capitalist Fred
Wilson once said, “he will ‘never, ever, ever, ever’ invest alongside a CVC
again. . . .”127 There are several reasons why corporate venture capitalists are
not displacing venture capitalists as the kings of Silicon Valley quite yet.
First, corporate venture capital has been more cyclical in its availability
to startups than traditional venture capital. For example, during the dot.com
boom, quarterly corporate venture capital investments peaked at “$6.2
billion at the beginning of 2000 and then tumbled to $848 million in the third
quarter of 2001.”128 As the article notes, “[w]hile private VC investments
also ebb and flow as the economy changes, the shifts in corporate VC
investments have been particularly dramatic.”129 This unsteadiness in the
face of short-term adverse market conditions “certainly contributes to the
low regard with which many private venture capitalists view in-house
corporate VC operations.”130 But this trend and the sentiment behind it may
be shifting. Many of the articles viewing corporate venture capital as a fad
were written during the dot.com times of two decades ago. More recent
articles suggest corporations have seen the benefits of long-term engagement
with startups and are less likely to pull back when macroeconomic conditions
worsen.131

125. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1904.
126. This is an impressive figure given that only 28.8% of all VC investments have
profitable exits. Edwards & McGinley, supra note 99, at 1922 (citing Paul Gompers & Silpa
Kovvali, The Other Diversity Dividend, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/0
7/the-other-diversity-dividend [https://perma.cc/8J9R-UKX4]).
127. Park & Vermeulen, supra note 86, at 764.
128. Henry W. Chesbrough, Making Sense of Corporate Venture Capital, HARV. BUS.
REV. 90, 90 (2002).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 92.
131. See Weiblen & Chesbrough, supra note 63, at 68 (“[T]he growth and increasing
viability of startup firms, and their attendant disruption, create a new imperative to develop
more agile, rapid means for large companies to engage with the startup community”); James
Thorne, Corporate VC Firms Buck ‘Tourist’ Reputation With Pandemic Dealmaking,
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Second, only corporate venture capitalists with a strategic focus have
historically done well. A strategic focus means investing in related, often
complimentary or competitive, products or services to the corporate venture
capitalist’s parent company. Thus, Facebook’s corporate venture capital
programs will support its app developers, but will not invest in non-related
products or services. On the one hand, this is a positive, as corporations
“must be aware of their value proposition towards a startup—how they can
add value to startups that already have access to [traditional] VCs,
incubators, and other support institutions.”132 On the other hand, a strategic
focus limits means that a wide swatch of startups may be automatically
rejected for funding by the likes of Google, Facebook, and Salesforce
corporate venture capitalists because they are developing technologies
unrelated to those core businesses.
Third, Mark Lemley and Andrew McCreary have recently argued that
the most common exit strategy for startups—acquisition by an established
company in the same field, or trade sale133—is actually harmful for
innovation more broadly.134 This is because the acquiror often views the
startup as a potential threat, and shelves its potentially disruptive technology
post-acquisition.135 They note that “Facebook, Google, and Oracle have all
bought and shut down competing firms, sometimes in the same day.”136 If
Lemley and McCreary are correct, this same possibility exists in corporate

PITCHBOOK (Sept. 28, 2020), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/corporate-vc-firms-pand
emic-dealmaking-rate-bucks-tourist-reputation [https://perma.cc/9BFU-WW78]
CVC firms are cementing their presence in the startup ecosystem in a year when
they could have retreated to the sidelines. So far in 2020, these investors have
participated in 25.5% of all US venture capital deals, on pace to match a recent
high in 2018, according to PitchBook data. That activity defies a perception that
CVCs are part of a class of tourist investors that tend to back off in difficult
economic circumstances. Such was the case following the global financial
crisis. . . .
132. Weiblen & Chesbrough, supra note 63, at 68.
133. Eyal-Cohen, supra note 23, at 195 (noting that large corporations “have served as an
exit hub for private entrepreneurship.”).
134. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 101.
135. Lemley and McCreary discuss “killer acquisitions,” where the acquiring company
has been known to shelve the potential that they acquire the same day. Lemley & McCreary,
supra note 9, at 63 (“[T]ech giants often buy up promising startups only to shut them down.
Sometimes this is intentional.
Economists have documented cases of ‘killer
acquisitions’. . . .”).
136. Id. at 64; see also Matthew Wansley, Beach Money Exits, 45 IOWA J. CORP. L. 151,
201 (2019) (“[I]n some cases, the anticompetitive acquirer may not have a plan to develop the
potentially competing product or use the startup’s assets at all.”).
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venture capitalist.137 Corporate venture capitalists can invest in startups that
are potential threats at an earlier stage and for far cheaper than acquiring
them later – but with the same result. Through board seats, and informal
influence post-investment, corporate venture capitalists can slow down or
shelve a startup’s technology before it challenges the parent company’s core
business.
While the competitive threats from corporate venture capital may
appear even greater than for corporate acquisitions of the same startup later,
Lemley and McCreary suggest corporate venture capital is actually less
problematic. Indeed, they observe that, “Some incumbents might choose to
buy a minority position in their emerging rivals . . . . So long as this position
is not one of significant or controlling influence, it’s less problematic than
acquisitions.”138 And it is a risk worth taking because without allowing
corporate venture capital investments or trade sales, we might never get
disruptive innovation off the ground in the first place.139
IV. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL
The preceding Part examined the pros and cons of corporate venture
capital from an economic and innovation take. This Part examines unique
legal considerations that may differentiate corporate venture capitalist from
its traditional counterparts. The three legal considerations discussed in this
Part are disclosure, antitrust, and conflicts of interests.
By way of preview: venture capitalists are notoriously secretive about
their investment returns. As privately-funded limited partnerships, they are
137. A study also found that entrepreneurs were less likely to seek corporate venture
capitalist when the corporate venture capitalist’s parent could imitate the startup’s technology.
G. Dushnitsky & J.M. Sahver, Limitations to Interorganizational Knowledge Acquisition: The
Paradox of Corporate Venture Capital, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1045 (2009).
138. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 80. Countering their own counterargument,
however, they find that startups “are less likely to compete aggressively if they share
investors,” implying that corporate venture capitalist investment can cause a startup to pivot
away from challenging the parent corporation’s business. Lemley & McCreary, supra note
9, at 80.
139. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 69 (“[W]e should be wary not just of the ex
post consequences of incumbent acquisitions, but the ex ante consequences of preventing
them – because then we’ll really never see Schumpeterian competition get off the ground.”);
Gordon M. Phillips & Alexei Zhdanov, Venture Capital Investments and Merger and
Acquisition Activity Around the World (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 24082, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24082 [https://perma.cc/WK6D-7TQT] (“While mergers of
firms that are horizontally competing may indeed reduce innovation, general policies where
a large firm is prevented from buying a smaller firm may have deleterious effects on the ex
ante incentives to conduct R&D by the smaller firm. . . .”).
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not required to disclose financial performance, and have even threatened to
exclude limited partners from venture capitalist funds if they were to disclose
their gains from venture capitalist investments.140 This Part explores whether
securities laws will force corporate venture capitalists to be more transparent.
Second, following Lemley and McCreary’s line of argument, if corporations
acquiring their startup competitors exacerbates antitrust concerns in the
technology industry, then corporate venture capital might raise the same
concerns.141 Finally, corporate venture capital investors sitting on startup
boards may face divided loyalties – as fiduciaries to the startups on whose
boards they sit, and to the parent corporations that put them there. How do
they serve both interests?
A. Disclosure Requirements
The world of venture capital is long on lore and short on empirics. With
more data on the venture capital industry as a whole, we might see a less rosy
picture of venture capital than the sexy one portrayed in the media.
Independent studies have found that venture capital returns are heavily
skewed toward the top firms.142 Yet venture capitalists on all rungs of the
140. See infra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
141. Lemley and McCreary are not discussing corporate venture capital in their article. I
am simply extending their concerns about trade sales to that realm.
142. See Richard Smith et al., VC Fund Financial Performance: The Relative Importance
of IPO and M&A Exits and Exercise of Abandonment Options, 40 FIN. MGMT. 1029, 1037
(2011)
These are a subset of the 6,206 conventional US VC funds we identified from
VE. For the 1,285 with IRR data, the simple average IRR is 13.7%, a return that
perhaps is below common perceptions of typical VC fund returns. The IRR
distribution is highly skewed, with the top 10% of funds reporting IRRs of 39.2%
or greater.
Wade T Brooks & Robert E Wiltbank, Tracking Angel Returns, ANGEL RES. INST. 9 (2017),
https://angelresourceinstitute.org/reports/tracking-angel-returns-2017-update.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7WUN-FWXZ]
Returns are not normally distributed, but are skewed such that 10% of all exits
generated 85% of all cash. This concentration of returns is consistent over all
studies of venture investing . . . Angel investing, like formal VC, is a homerun
game, where many investments result in losses, but the occurrence of large
homeruns are the key driver of the rate of return.
Chilazi, supra note 112, at 4
[A] slightly older study examining VC firms between 1986 and 1999 found that
29 firms invested $21 billion (14% of industry capital) and returned $85 billion
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totem pole are historically unwilling to release performance results. State
pension funds, as heavy investors in venture capitalist funds, have run into
hot water with venture capitalists when laws of the pension funds’ home
states might require the pension funds to disclose the results of their venture
capitalist investments.143 In fact, several states amended their laws so that
pension funds could keep these investment results private.144 Otherwise,
venture capitalists were threatening to exclude those pension funds from
future investments.145
Will corporate venture capital be any different in terms of transparency?
Perhaps. First, large corporations might voluntarily disclose investments
that further gender and race progress as a public relations matter.146 Second,
in that time, a 3.6x multiple, while the remaining crop of more than 500 firms
invested $160 billion and returned $85 billion, a 0.4-0.6x multiple on average.
Thus, a very small number of top VC firms drives the returns for the entire
industry.
(citation omitted).
143. Arleen Jacobius, States Act to Make Public Funds ‘Dance Partners’ Again, PENSIONS
& INV., Aug. 8, 2005, at 4
Executives of the top-tier private equity funds - reluctant to have sensitive
performance data released - responded by rejecting these pension and endowment
funds as investors or limiting asset and performance information they were
given. . . . [A] few top-tier firms such as Sequoia Capital, Charles River Ventures
and U.S. Venture Partners declined to accept any public pension fund or
endowment limited partners because they did not want even fund return
information released. Last year, Sequoia Capital asked the $3.5 billion
University of Michigan endowment and the $62 billion University of California
pension and endowment funds to leave its venture capital fund.
144. Id.
State legislators across the country now are giving their public fund executives
tools to help them get back into top private equity funds. New laws in Colorado,
Michigan, Virginia, Maryland, Utah and Texas limit the information public funds
are required to release. A bill in Illinois is awaiting the governor’s signature, and
in California and Pennsylvania, bills on the issue have been introduced.
Arleen Jacobius, Colorado Oks Law: Disclosure Exemption; States Try to Ease Rules to Help
Public Plans Stay in Private Equity Funds, PENSIONS & INV., Apr. 5, 2004, at 1 (“Legislators
in three states are trying to allay public pension executives’ fears that they would be excluded
from top-tier private equity funds if forced to publicly disclose information about their private
equity and venture capital investments.”).
145. See supra notes 143, 144.
146. More than thirty large corporations have agreed to new disclosures of private race,
gender and ethnicity workforce data. This data release was the result of a broader initiative
and push by the New York City comptroller and three retirement funds. BLOOMBERG, Amazon
and GM Among 34 Companies to Disclose Private Diversity Data, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2020),
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perhaps securities law requires more disclosure about corporate venture
capital activities.
Public corporations must disclose “significant
subsidiaries” in a 10-K filing.147 In May 2020, the SEC adopted amendments
to its rules and forms to clarify the “significance tests” in the “significant
subsidiary” definition in Rule 1-02(w), Securities Act Rule 405, and
Exchange Act Rule 12b-2.148 These amendments were aimed to improve the
application of these rules and “to assist registrants in making more
meaningful determinations of whether a subsidiary or an acquired . . .
business is significant.”149 Effective January 1, 2021, a “significant
subsidiary” is defined as a subsidiary, including its subsidiaries, which meets
the conditions of one of the three specified tests: the Investment Test,150
Asset Test,151 or Income Test.152 The threshold for all three tests is ten

5:25 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-09-28/amazon-workplace-diversity-dat
a [https://perma.cc/3A4L-PRQC]. Consistent with this broader social initiative, corporations
might take this disclosure further to share investment information regarding diversity. See
Richard F. Lacaille, Diversity Strategy, Goals & Disclosure: Our Expectations for Public
Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 1 (Sep. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2020/09/13/diversity-strategy-goals-disclosure-our-expectations-for-public-com
panies/ [https://perma.cc/B26R-KL9Y] (“State Street Global Advisors will ask companies in
our investment portfolio to articulate their risks, goals and strategy as related to racial and
ethnic diversity, and to make relevant disclosure available to shareholders.”).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(21) (2020).
148. Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Amendments to Improve
Financial Disclosures About Acquisitions and Dispositions of Businesses (May 21, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-118 [https://perma.cc/4JFW-SGFT].
149. Id.
150. The Investment Test is met for dispositions and acquisitions “when the registrant’s
and its other subsidiaries’ investments in and advances to the tested subsidiary exceed 10
percent of the aggregate worldwide market value of the registrant’s voting and non-voting
common equity, if applicable.” 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(w)(1)(i) (2021).
151. The Asset Test is met “when the registrant’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate
share of the tested subsidiary’s consolidated total assets (after intercompany eliminations)
exceeds 10 percent of such total assets of the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated as of
the end of the most recently completed fiscal year.” 17 C.F.R. § 210.1–02(w)(1)(ii) (2021).
152. The Income Test is met when:
(1) [t]he absolute value of the registrant’s and its other subsidiaries’ equity in the
tested subsidiary’s consolidated income or loss from continuing operations
before income taxes (after intercompany eliminations) attributable to the
controlling interests exceeds 10 percent of the absolute value of such income or
loss of the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated for the most recently
completed fiscal year; and (2) the registrant’s and its other subsidiaries’
proportionate share of the tested subsidiary’s consolidated total revenue from
continuing operations (after intercompany eliminations) exceeds 10 percent of
such total revenue of the registrant and its subsidiaries consolidated for the most
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percent.153 These are unlikely thresholds for corporate venture capital arms
to reach at current levels.
Further, even if corporate venture capitalist arms are disclosed as
significant subsidiaries, the investments that a corporate venture capitalist
makes would not require disclosure.
Neither amounts pumped into
corporate venture capital arms nor those arms’ investments into startups are
material to a large parent corporation’s operations, cash flows, or financial
position.154 Corporations “report realized and unrealized gains and losses
based on changes in estimated fair values of ‘other investments,’” but more
specific details regarding its investments are not included.155 Often parent
firms leave the type of corporate venture capital investments and investees’
names unreported.156 For firms that do disclose their corporate venture
capitalist activities, their disclosures are found in various sections of their
10-K filings.157
Consistent with the materiality threshold, firms are more forthcoming
with information when the amounts invested in their corporate venture
capitalist portfolio are higher.158 Firms also provide more corporate venture
capitalist disclosure when dedicated institutional ownership is lower,
transient institutional ownership is higher, and industry competition is
lower.159 While firms may voluntarily disclose some corporate venture
capitalist information, theories about voluntary disclosure suggest that firms
withhold corporate venture capitalist activities for fear of inciting
competition.160 Firms are hesitant to disclose their investments when they
are made in ventures falling outside of their business and core industry.161
Firms want to withhold this information to prevent revealing their strategies
concerning future acquisition areas or specific targets.162
recently completed fiscal year.
17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(w)(1)(iii) (2021).
153. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1–02(w)(1)(i) – (iii) (2021).
154. Sophia J.W. Hamm, Michael J. Jung & Min Park, How Transparent are Firms About
Their Corporate Venture Capital Investments?, 7 (Apr. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https
://accounting.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/SAC_Jung.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5T36-VK2C].
155. Id. at 9.
156. Id. at 9, 13.
157. Id. at 13.
158. Hamm, supra note 154, at 4, 27.
159. Hamm, supra note 154, at 4.
160. Hamm, supra note 154, at 27, 34.
161. Hamm, supra note 154, at 27.
162. Hamm, supra note 154. at 31, 34
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While many corporations disclose no information about their corporate
venture capitalist activities, these activities are still disclosed indirectly.
Startups may disclose a corporate venture capitalist investment.163 This
information is disclosed through industry trade publications, company press
releases, websites, and social media.164 These announcements typically
include how much money was raised, who the investors are, which investor
led the round, and what stage the company is in. This announcement serves
an important market signaling function for the startups and necessarily
discloses a corporate venture capitalist’s (or venture capitalist’s)
involvement.165
B. Antitrust Considerations
Lemley and McCreary have exposed the link between the Silicon
Valley ecosystem and consolidation of the tech industry.166 Venture
capitalists invest to achieve a successful exit, and now more than ever, that
form of exit is selling a startup to a larger competitor in the same tech field.167
In these instances, tech giants like Google, Facebook, and Amazon have the
“However, even after firms announce an acquisition and reveal that the target
firm had been a part of its corporate venture capital portfolio, most firms do not
disclose financial terms, which prevents investors from fully assessing the
financial and accounting implications of a firm’s corporate venture capital
program on an aggregate or individual deal level.”
163. Hamm, supra note 154, at 12.
164. Hamm, supra note 154, at 11.
165. The SEC is not the only federal agency mandating and monitoring corporate venture
capital disclosure. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued Special Orders in February
of 2020 to Alphabet Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., Apple Inc., Facebook, Inc., and Microsoft Corp.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology
Companies (Feb. 11, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/
02/ftc-examine-past-acquisitions-large-technology-companies [https://perma.cc/39LZ-NFK
V]. These orders required the named companies to provide information about their prior
acquisitions that were not reported to the antitrust agencies under the HSR Act. Hamm, supra
note 154, at 11. Specifically, the FTC requested “information and documents on the terms,
scope, structure, and purpose of transactions that each company consummated between Jan.
1, 2010 and Dec. 31, 2019.” Id.
166. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 4 (“[T]he technology industry has become a
winner-take-all affair, with market concentration increasing and one or two firm dominating
a wide variety of markets. . . .”).
167. Bushra Samimi, The Antitrust Impact of Venture Capital Firms on Concentration in
the Technology Sector, 11 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 155, 156–166 (2020); Lemley &
McCreary, supra note 9, at 8 (“[T]he exit strategy for most startups is acquisition, and . . . the
most likely acquiror is the very incumbent the startup’s technology might otherwise
challenge.”).
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opportunity to acquire startups.168 This, in turn, increases the tech giants’
market power and results in a highly concentrated market that Lemley and
McCreary argue could inhibit innovation. 169 Ex ante, however, knowing that
tech giants are a viable exit option to startups encourages entrepreneurs to
start businesses and venture capitalists to invest in those businesses.170 As
discussed earlier in the Article, the net societal effect on innovation of
acquisition-by-competitor is an open question. For our purposes, does it, and
by expanding the scope of the inquiry into corporate venture capital, raise
antitrust concerns?
Probably not. Using antitrust to limit the reach of tech giants, even
through antitrust’s preferred lens of giants acquiring potential competitors
(as opposed to corporate venture capital), has been largely ineffective.171
Antitrust is largely focused on horizontal mergers of competitors, not large
fish gobbling up smaller ones.172 Lemley and McCreary recommend
antitrust law do more “to limit the sale of innovative startups to
incumbents.”173 If antitrust does not reach these acquisitions, however, it has
little hope of preventing corporate venture capitalist investments in startups,
even Schumpeterian competitors. Still, Scott Hemphill and Tim Wu have
recently argued that “nascent competitors” of the type corporate venture
capitalists invest in or their parent corporations gobble up through
acquisition are vital to competition.174 They “identify nascent competition
as a distinct analytical category and outline a program of antitrust
enforcement to protect it.”175
Moving from theory to practice, Facebook’s acquisition activity
provides an interesting case study. Facebook acquired the nascent innovator
in its Instagram and WhatsApp acquisitions, and matched the competing
features of Snapchat after Snapchat turned down its three billion dollar
168. Samimi, supra note 167, at 155.
169. Samimi, supra note 167, at 155.
170. Phillips, supra note 139, at 1 (“While mergers of firms that are horizontally
competing may indeed reduce innovation, general policies where a large firm is prevented
from buying a smaller firm may have deleterious effects on the ex ante incentives to conduct
R&D by the smaller firm.”).
171. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 91 (“Unfortunately, the existence of antitrust
laws regulating mergers has not prevented exit strategies from leading to unprecedented
concentration in technology markets.”).
172. D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 1357,
1363–64 (2018); Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why
Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 878 (2016).
173. Lemley & McCreary, supra note 9, at 94.
174. C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Nascent Competitors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1889–
93 (2020).
175. Id. at 1881.
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acquisition offer.176 The FTC is conducting an antitrust probe reviewing
whether Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp were
anticompetitive.177 Given the very existence of the probe, Facebook
acquiring another social networking rival might be difficult.178 Whatever the
result of the probe, Facebook is likely developing other strategies like
corporate venture capital activity to identify emerging industry trends and
monitor the competition.179
Certainly, corporate venture capitalists who invest in startups would
have informational advantages about those startups and their technologies
going forward. However, it seems unlikely that antitrust laws will stifle
corporate venture capital. Perhaps even the critical authors above would
agree that corporate venture capitalist activity is not where antitrust scrutiny
should lie – it is premature for an antitrust analysis.
Additionally, Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filings are not required for
purchases made for investment only.180 If corporate venture capitalists can
lay claim to that exemption, they will have unlimited discretion to invest in
competitors without stoking antitrust concerns. However, given corporate
venture capitalist’s strategic focus, it is unclear whether this exemption
would apply. Even if it does not, HSR filings are only required for
transactions over ninety-four million dollars, which should exempt almost
every corporate venture capital transaction.181
176. Margaret Harding McGill, Tech’s Long Hot Summer of Antitrust, AXIOS (May 26,
2020), https://www.axios.com/tech-summer-antitrust-24cffcc6-8afc-41f8-9b91-5be6d8269
202.html [https://perma.cc/SXL9-3PG6]; Ina Fried & Kia Kokalitcheva, Scoop: Facebook
Establishing a Venture Arm to Invest in Startups, AXIOS (June 11, 2020),
https://www.axios.com/facebook-establishing-a-venture-arm-to-invest-in-startups-91d9ee
71-2282-4032-8f31-45b861a6ba9c.html [https://perma.cc/LJW4-3YMU].
Lemley &
McCreary, supra note 9, at 21 (“Facebook . . . has acquired over ninety companies, mainly
startups – building and maintaining its userbase partly by acquiring, and then often shuttering,
other services.”); Hemphill & Wu, supra note 174, at 1885–86 (“WhatsApp posed a nascent
competitive threat. . . .Facebook acquired WhatsApp for $22 billion, thereby eliminating the
competitive threat.”).
177. Jeff Horwtiz, Facebook Says Government Breakup of Instagram, Whatsapp Would
Be a ‘Complete Nonstarter,’ WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fac
ebook-says-government-breakup-of-instagram-whatsapp-would-be-complete-nonstarter-116
01803800 [https://perma.cc/4JQY-P4QX].
178. Fried & Kokalitcheva, supra note 176.
179. Fried & Kokalitcheva, supra note 176.
180. “Investment-Only” Means Just That, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/08/investment-only-mean
s-just [https://perma.cc/W982-9H76].
181. HSR Threshold Adjustments and Reportability for 2020, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (Jan.
31, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2020/01/hsr-threshol
d-adjustments-reportability-2020 [https://perma.cc/CDV5-MA9K].
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C. Conflicts of Interest
A third potential legal problem facing both venture capitalists and
corporate venture capitalists is conflicts of interest. Corporate law imposes
duties of care and loyalty on directors, be it of public companies or
startups.182 To meet the duty of care, a director must act on an informed
basis.183 The duty of care is easy to meet, however, and is not the duty that
poses the conundrum for venture capital employees acting as directors of the
startups in which their funds invest. These directors will generally be
informed enough to satisfy their duty of care,184 and exculpation provisions
including Delaware’s 102(b)(7) stand as another backstop against legal
liability.185
The duty that poses the potential problem is the duty of loyalty. To
meet the duty of loyalty, a director must serve the corporation on whose
board she sits rather than her own interests.186 By extension, a director’s
“own” interest includes the interest of another corporation she favors, such
as the parent corporation in corporate venture capital, or another portfolio
startup the fund has invested in. Given that a venture capitalist director
serves two masters, in actuality if not from a fiduciary standpoint,187 she may
have divided loyalties.
Traditional venture capitalists have faced this problem. Claims of
“financial tunneling,” or harming a less promising startup by diverting funds
to a more promising startup in the fund’s portfolio, have been lodged against

182. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) ([T]he “duty of care
and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary.”).
183. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[T]o invoke the [business
judgment] rule’s protection directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a
business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them. Having become
so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties”).
184. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 88 (“[I]f the business judgment rule does anything, it insulates directors
from liability for negligence.”).
185. Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 65 (Del.
2006) (“Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL, which authorizes Delaware corporations, by a
provision in the certificate of incorporation, to exculpate their directors from monetary
damage liability for a breach of the duty of care.”).
186. Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1290
(2015) (“Self-dealing offends the very essence of the fiduciary duty of loyalty applicable to
corporate managers. According to that duty, managers must place the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders ahead of their personal interests.”).
187. A corporate venture capital employee who sits on a startup board but not the board
of the parent corporation likely only owes fiduciary duties to the startup.
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venture capitalist directors in the past.188 Corporate venture capital
employees serving as portfolio company directors may face an even greater
challenge—balancing the interests of the startups they serve as directors with
what is best for the parent corporation. What if a director learns, through his
service on the startup’s board, that a startup’s product or service is
developing in a way that is likely to harm the parent corporation? Does she
tell the parent corporation? Make decisions that hinder the competitive
threat? The director is in the position, practically speaking, of serving two
masters. This potential problem is minimized, however, by the fact that
corporate venture capitalists, even if the lead VC investor in a round, take
fewer board seats than venture capitalists.189 But corporate venture capitalist
employees that do serve as directors must not engage in the equivalent of the
venture capitalist’s financial tunneling to avoid duty of loyalty concerns. In
sum, corporate venture capitalists must be cognizant of legal landmines to
avoid, most notably conflicts of interest, and develop strategies to avoid
them.
V. CONCLUSION
The Article has examined the only potential rival to venture capitalists’
dominance of entrepreneurial finance: the large corporation. Large
corporations have sufficient capital to fund startups and can offer superior
value-added services in some cases. Through their corporate venture
capitalist arms, large corporations can keep abreast the most promising
entrepreneurs and the emergence of disruptive technologies, which protects
their market and industry positions. Compared with venture capitalists,
corporate venture capitalists are desirable for several reasons, including
increasing diversity within the VC industry.
Important questions remain about corporate venture capital for future
law-and-entrepreneurship and law-and-economics scholarship.
Will
corporate venture capitalist continue to become an even cheaper, earlier
window into identifying and addressing competitive threats to dominant
corporations? Will corporate venture capitalists continue to co-invest with
venture capitalists or begin to crowd them out in technologies where
188. Vladimir Atanasov et al., Does Reputation Limit Opportunistic Behavior in the VC
Industry? Evidence From Litigation Against VCs, 67 J. FIN. 2215, 2219 (2012) (VCs “could
engage in transfer pricing by arranging for one portfolio ﬁrm to purchase intellectual property,
services, or other assets from another portfolio company at non-arm’s-length prices. VCs
could also allocate business opportunities un-equally among the ﬁrms in their portfolios.”).
189. See Amornsiripanitch, supra note 31, at 539 (“Corporate venture capital investors are
far less likely to take board seats, even if they are the lead investor.”).
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corporate venture capitalists are active? How will the legal landscape
develop and impact this equation? Will corporate venture capitalist play a
meaningful role in addressing the diversity shortfalls in the VC industry? All
of this remains to be seen.

